Aggregator
Palo Alto Networks security advisory (AV25-748)
Google sues to dismantle Chinese phishing platform behind US toll scams
Mozilla security advisory (AV25-747)
Nile’s Bold Claim: Your LAN Architecture Is Fundamentally Broken
At Security Field Day, Nile delivered a message that challenges decades of enterprise networking orthodoxy: the traditional Local Area Network architecture is fundamentally obsolete for modern security requirements. The problem isn’t subtle. While connectivity remains the lifeblood of most organizations, traditional LAN environments—where the majority of users and devices operate—receive the least investment and are..
The post Nile’s Bold Claim: Your LAN Architecture Is Fundamentally Broken appeared first on Security Boulevard.
CVE-2024-2227 | SailPoint IdentityIQ up to 8.1p6/8.2p6/8.3p3/8.4 JavaServer Faces path traversal
CVE-2024-12235 | Shenzhen Dashi Tongzhou Information Technology AgileBPM up to 1.0.0 AuthorizationTokenCheckFilter.java doFilter access control
CVE-2025-27084 | HPE Aruba Networking AOS up to 8.10.0.15/8.12.0.3/10.4.1.6/10.7.1.0 Captive Portal cross site scripting
CVE-2023-53036 | Linux Kernel up to 6.1.21/6.2.8 privilege escalation
CVE-2023-53043 | Linux Kernel up to 6.1.21/6.2.8 arm64 privilege escalation
CVE-2023-53038 | Linux Kernel up to 5.15.104/6.1.21/6.2.8 scsi kzalloc null pointer dereference
CVE-2023-53040 | Linux Kernel up to 6.2.8 ca8210 ieee802154_hdr_peek_addrs buffer overflow (Nessus ID 250205)
CVE-2023-53037 | Linux Kernel up to 6.1.21/6.2.8 scsi memory corruption (Nessus ID 246947)
CVE-2023-53042 | Linux Kernel up to 6.1.20/6.2.7 privilege escalation (EUVD-2025-13225)
CVE-2023-53039 | Linux Kernel up to 5.15.104/6.1.21/6.2.8 HID ish_probe use after free (EUVD-2025-13231 / Nessus ID 240812)
CVE-2024-2228 | SailPoint IdentityIQ up to 8.1p6/8.2p6/8.3p3/8.4 Lifecycle Manager privileges management
CVE-2024-35475 | OpenKM up to 6.3.11 /admin/DatabaseQuery cross-site request forgery
Google sues cybercriminal group Smishing Triad
NDSS 2025 – Wallbleed: A Memory Disclosure Vulnerability in the Great Firewall of China
SESSION
Session 3A: Network Security 1
Authors, Creators & Presenters: Shencha Fan (GFW Report), Jackson Sippe (University of Colorado Boulder), Sakamoto San (Shinonome Lab), Jade Sheffey (UMass Amherst), David Fifield (None), Amir Houmansadr (UMass Amherst), Elson Wedwards (None), Eric Wustrow (University of Colorado Boulder)
PAPER
Wallbleed: A Memory Disclosure Vulnerability in the Great Firewall of China
We present textit(Wallbleed), a buffer over-read vulnerability that existed in the DNS injection subsystem of the Great Firewall of China. Wallbleed caused certain nation-wide censorship middleboxes to reveal up to 125 bytes of their memory when censoring a crafted DNS query. It afforded a rare insight into one of the Great Firewall's well-known network attacks, namely DNS injection, in terms of its internal architecture and the censor's operational behaviors. To understand the causes and implications of Wallbleed, we conducted longitudinal and Internet-wide measurements for over two years from October 2021. We (1) reverse-engineered the injector's parsing logic, (2) evaluated what information was leaked and how Internet users inside and outside of China were affected, and (3) monitored the censor's patching behaviors over time. We identified possible internal traffic of the censorship system, analyzed its memory management and load-balancing mechanisms, and observed process-level changes in an injector node. We employed a new side channel to distinguish the injector's multiple processes to assist our analysis. Our monitoring revealed that the censor coordinated an incorrect patch for Wallbleed in November 2023 and fully patched it in March 2024. Wallbleed exemplifies that the harm censorship middleboxes impose on Internet users is even beyond their obvious infringement of freedom of expression. When implemented poorly, it also imposes severe privacy and confidentiality risks to Internet users.
ABOUT NDSS The Network and Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS) fosters information exchange among researchers and practitioners of network and distributed system security. The target audience includes those interested in practical aspects of network and distributed system security, with a focus on actual system design and implementation. A major goal is to encourage and enable the Internet community to apply, deploy, and advance the state of available security technologies.
Our thanks to the Network and Distributed System Security (NDSS) Symposium for publishing their Creators, Authors and Presenter’s superb NDSS Symposium 2025 Conference content on the organization’s’ YouTube channel.
The post NDSS 2025 – Wallbleed: A Memory Disclosure Vulnerability in the Great Firewall of China appeared first on Security Boulevard.
NDSS 2025 – A Holistic Security Analysis Of Google Fuchsia’s (And gVisor’s) Network Stack
SESSION
Session 2D: Android Security 1
Authors, Creators & Presenters: Inon Kaplan (Independent Researcher), Ron Even (Independent Researcher), Amit Klein (The Hebrew University Of Jerusalem, Israel)
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PAPER
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You Can Rand but You Can't Hide: A Holistic Security Analysis of Google Fuchsia's (and gVisor's) Network Stack
This research is the first holistic analysis of the algorithmic security of the Google Fuchsia/gVisor network stack. Google Fuchsia is a new operating system developed by Google in a "clean slate" fashion. It is conjectured to eventually replace Android as an operating system for smartphones, tablets, and IoT devices. Fuchsia is already running in millions of Google Nest Hub consumer products. Google gVisor is an application kernel used by Google's App Engine, Cloud Functions, Cloud ML Engine, Cloud Run, and Google Kubernetes Engine (GKE). Google Fuchsia uses the gVisor network stack code for its TCP/IP implementation. We report multiple vulnerabilities in the algorithms used by Fuchsia/gVisor to populate network protocol header fields, specifically the TCP initial sequence number, TCP timestamp, TCP and UDP source ports, and IPv4/IPv6 fragment ID fields. In our holistic analysis, we show how a combination of multiple attacks results in the exposure of a PRNG seed and a hashing key used to generate the above fields. This enables an attacker to predict future values of the fields, which facilitates several network attacks. Our work focuses on web-based device tracking based on the stability and relative uniqueness of the PRNG seed and the hashing key. We demonstrate our device tracking techniques over the Internet with browsers running on multiple Fuchsia devices, in multiple browser modes (regular/privacy), and over multiple networks (including IPv4 vs. IPv6). Our tests verify that device tracking for Fuchsia is practical and yields a reliable device ID. We conclude with recommendations on mitigating the attacks and their root causes. We reported our findings to Google, which issued CVEs and patches for the security vulnerabilities we disclosed.
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ABOUT NDSS
The Network and Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS) fosters information exchange among researchers and practitioners of network and distributed system security. The target audience includes those interested in practical aspects of network and distributed system security, with a focus on actual system design and implementation. A major goal is to encourage and enable the Internet community to apply, deploy, and advance the state of available security technologies.
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Our thanks to the Network and Distributed System Security (NDSS) Symposium for publishing their Creators, Authors and Presenter’s superb NDSS Symposium 2025 Conference content on the organization’s’ YouTube channel.
The post NDSS 2025 – A Holistic Security Analysis Of Google Fuchsia’s (And gVisor’s) Network Stack appeared first on Security Boulevard.