Email has been the norm for decades now, as most digitally connected people use it to communicate in both their...
The post Gmail Users: App Developers Can Potentially Read Your Private Emails appeared first on McAfee Blog.
Verisign just released its Q1 2018 DDoS Trends Report, which represents a unique view into the attack trends unfolding online, through observations and insights derived from distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack mitigations enacted on behalf of Verisign DDoS Protection Services, and security research conducted by Verisign Security Services. Verisign observed that 58 percent of DDoS attacks […]
The post Q1 2018 DDoS Trends Report: 58 Percent of Attacks Employed Multiple Attack Types appeared first on Verisign Blog.
Ever hear “Despacito” on the radio? Of course you did! It was the song of 2017 – taking over radios,...
The post Android Users Hit With Mobile Billing Fraud Due to Sonvpay Malware appeared first on McAfee Blog.
Security is an ever-escalating arms race. The good guys have gotten better about monitoring the file system for artifacts of advanced threat actors. They in turn are avoiding the file system and burrowing deeper into Windows to find places to store their malware code and dependably trigger its execution in order to gain persistence between reboots.
For decades the Run and RunOnce keys in the registry have been favorite bad guy locations for persistence but we know to monitor them using Windows auditing for sysmon. So, attackers in the know have moved on to WMI.
WMI is such a powerful area of Windows for good or evil. Indeed, the bad guys have found effective ways to hide and persist malware in WMI. In this article I’ll show you a particularly sophisticated way to persist malware with WMI Event Filters and Consumers.
WMI allows you to link these 2 objects in order to execute a custom action whenever specified things happen in Windows. WMI events are related to but more general than the events we all know and love in the event log. WMI events include system startup, time intervals, program execution and many, many other things. You can define a __EventFilter which is basically a WQL query that specifies what events you want to catch in WMI. This is a permanent object saved in the WMI repository. It’s passive until you create a consumer and link them with a binding. The WMI event consumer defines what the system should do with any events caught by the filter. There are different kinds of event consumers for action like running a script, executing a command line, sending an email or writing to a log file. Finally, you link the filter and consumer with a __FilterToConsumerBinding. After saving the binding, everything is now active and whenever events matching the filter occur, they are fed to the consumer.
So how would an attacker cause his malware to start up each time Windows reboots? Just create a filter that catches some event that happens shortly after startup. Here’s what PowerSploit uses for that purpose:
SELECT * FROM __InstanceModificationEvent WITHIN 60 WHERE TargetInstance ISA 'Win32_PerfFormattedData_PerfOS_System' AND TargetInstance.SystemUpTime >= 200 AND TargetInstance.SystemUpTime < 320
Then you create a WMI Event Consumer which is another permanent object stored in the WMI Repository. Here’s some VB code adapted from mgeeky’s WMIPersistence.vbs script on Github. It’s incomplete, but edited for clarity. If you want to play with this functionality refer to https://gist.github.com/mgeeky/d00ba855d2af73fd8d7446df0f64c25a:
Set objInstances2 = objService1.Get("CommandLineEventConsumer")
Set consumer = objInstances2.Spawninstance_
consumer.name = “MyConsumer”
consumer.CommandLineTemplate = “c:\bad\malware.exe”
consumer.Put_
So now you have a filter that looks for when the system has recently started up and a consumer which runs c:\bad\malware.exe but nothing’s going to happen until they are linked like this:
Set objInstances3 = objService1.Get("__FilterToConsumerBinding")
Set binding = objInstances3.Spawninstance_
binding.Filter = "__EventFilter.Name=""MyFilter"""
binding.Consumer = "CommandLineEventConsumer.Name=""MyConsumer"""
binding.Put_
So now you have a filter that looks for when the system has recently started up and a consumer which runs c:\bad\malware.exe.
As a good guy (or girl) how do you catch something like this? There are no events in the Windows Security Log, but thankfully Sysmon 6.10 added 3 new events for catching WMI Filter and Consumer Activity as well as the binding which makes them active.
Sysmon Event ID
Example
19 - WmiEventFilter activity detected
WmiEventFilter activity detected:
EventType: WmiFilterEvent
UtcTime: 2018-04-11 16:26:16.327
Operation: Created
User: LAB\rsmith
EventNamespace: "root\\cimv2"
Name: "MyFilter"
Query: "SELECT * FROM __InstanceModificationEvent WITHIN 60 WHERE TargetInstance ISA 'Win32_PerfFormattedData_PerfOS_System' AND TargetInstance.SystemUpTime >= 200 AND TargetInstance.SystemUpTime < 320"
20 - WmiEventConsumer activity detected
WmiEventConsumer activity detected:
EventType: WmiConsumerEvent
UtcTime: 2018-04-11 16:26:16.360
Operation: Created
User: LAB\rsmith
Name: "MyConsumer"
Type: Command Line
Destination: "c:\\bad\\malware.exe "
21 - WmiEventConsumerToFilter activity detected
WmiEventConsumerToFilter activity detected:
EventType: WmiBindingEvent
UtcTime: 2018-04-11 16:27:02.565
Operation: Created
User: LAB\rsmith
Consumer: "CommandLineEventConsumer.Name=\"MyConsumer\""
Filter: "__EventFilter.Name=\"MyFilter\""
As you can see, the events provide full details so that you can analyze the WMI operations to determine if they are legitimate or malicious. From event ID 19 I can see that the filter is looking for system startup. Event Id 20 shows me the name of the program that executes and I can see from event ID 21 that they are linked.
If you add these events to your monitoring you’ll want to analyze activity for a while in order whitelist the regular, legitimate producers of these events in your particular environment.
Sidebar:
That’s persistence via WMI for you, but you might have noted that we are not file-less at this point; my malware is just a conventional exe in c:\bad. To stay off the file system, bad guys have resorted to creating new WMI classes and storing their logic in a PowerShell script in a property on that class. Then they set up a filter that kicks off a short PowerShell command that retrieves their larger code from the custom WMI Class and calls. Usually this is combined with some obfuscation like base64 encoding and maybe encryption too.
“This article by Randy Smith was originally published by EventTracker”https://www.eventtracker.com/tech-articles/catch-malware-hiding-in-wmi-with-sysmon/
Does the name “Fortnite” ring any bells? It should, because it’s probably the most popular video game in the world...
The post Heads Up Gamers! Fake Fortnite Android Apps Are Being Spread via YouTube Videos appeared first on McAfee Blog.
本文总结一下漫长的渗透测试过程，想尽了各种方法，终于找到了突破口。so没有绝对的安全，所谓的安全性其实都是相对的～
信息踩点在这里其实没办法去做一些有价值的收集，只能踩点，踩坑。
信息难点： 传输加密：要做渗透的目标是一个APP，根据抓到的请求包发现这个APP是经过某产品加固过的，所以HTTP的POST请求正文部分(Data)是神奇的密文～
分析难点分析：
在这里请教了师傅，说可能GET请求参数并没有经过加密，而后台很有可能是这样写的：
<?php $mstsec = $_REQUEST['vulkey'];//注意这里使用的是$_REQUEST 默认情况下包含了 $_GET，$_POST 和 $_COOKIE 的数组。 ?>其实对APP做渗透测试，大部分情况下还是对网站做渗透测试。
所以在这里抓包获取到的HOST，直接对其进行了前期的常规信息刺探（端口、目录、指纹…）
中间件：Tomcat
目录开放：/fileUpload/
端口开放：8001 1444
APP三个功能点：个人用户、资金管理、生活栏目
渗透开端一开始粗略的对整个APP进行抓包，然后做一些简单的测试，发现并没有那种明面上的漏洞（SQL注入、XSS等等…），但是获取了这几条URI：
仔细的对每个功能点进行测试的时候，抓到了一些”逃出加固命运”的明文报文。
执行了whoami：
然而没看清楚，一下次给日错地方了…很尴尬。
关联分析日偏后我分析了一下两者的特征，发现应该出自同一个程序员之手，并且这个程序员很喜欢使用驼峰命名法…
验证设想(A)在这里我尝试根据每个URI功能点生成GET请求参数的dict：
/userCenter/getUser [获取用户信息URI POST]
dict: [uId, userId, uName, userName …]
/userCenter/showQRcode [获取二维码图片 POST]
dict: [uId, userId, uName, userName, imagePath, filePath, codePath, fileName …]
生成请求：
GET /userCenter/getUser?uId=10001 GET /userCenter/getUser?userId=10001 GET /userCenter/getUser?uName=test001 GET /userCenter/getUser?userName=test001 ... GET /userCenter/showQRcode?uId=10001 GET /userCenter/showQRcode?userId=10001 GET /userCenter/showQRcode?uName=test001 GET /userCenter/showQRcode?userName=test001 GET /userCenter/showQRcode?imagePath=../../index.do GET /userCenter/showQRcode?filePath=../../index.do GET /userCenter/showQRcode?codePath=../../index.do GET /userCenter/showQRcode?fileName=../../index.do ... 结论现实残酷，打败了设想。
绝处逢生就在想放弃的时候，决定打算”垂死挣扎”一下，重新开始”审视”了各个功能模块，眼光又转到了这个二维码地方。（因为二维码的”皮相”，所以很多人都会忽略它）
这里我去解析了二维码的地址：
失算…失算…，当去访问这个地址的时候，响应报文中会多出这样的头：
... Set-Cookie: USESSIONPID=xxx; ... jpg content这时候我就知道是时候修改uId了，然而修改了没用，根据多年的经验（吹牛）我认为是uSign参数起了作用，这时候对uSign进行删除发现不行，会提示uSign参数不存在，当我置空这个参数，发现居然成功了又返回了用户的Cookie凭证…好吧，说明这里有一个逻辑问题…
到这下去就很简单了，获取管理员权限有上传点，测试使用jhtml的后缀可以直接绕过上传，但是上传上去之后，直接访问就给你download下来了（很多次遇到这种问题…）
好吧，管理员也没啥能危害到服务器的东西了…不过回过头再来看看，二维码这个点还没啃完呢，fileName这个参数还没去测试，fuzzdb了解一下，先怼lfi的字典进去跑（有个坑这里一定要填写完整[uId, uSign]），然后再进行Fuzz：
从intruder模块(BurpSuite)的测试结果发现这里是可以读取文件的，并且判断这个web服务是root权限运行的因为我修改fileName参数的值为../../../etc/shadow时我直接可以获取到文件的内容，从而获取root账号权限的密码：
(解密不了)，怎么通过这个本地文件读取漏洞拿到shell？我的思路是通过读取tomcat的密码配置文件然后进入tomcat的Web管理部署war包进行getwebshell，但是这里做了一圈的目录猜解，死活没找到tomcat的应用目录…
读取/root/.bash_history啊(这个文件是记录root用户输入过的命令-老师傅提醒到)，突然间我茅塞顿开，是啊，一般运维人员会通过命令行进行管理，那么肯定会有目录出现啊。
我修改fileName参数的值为../../../root/.bash_history，搜索下关键词tomcat就发现了：
成功的发现了root用户的命令历史并且找到了Tomat的应用安装路径，那么我只需要修改fileName的参数值为../../../../home/apache-tomcat-7.0.67/conf/tomcat-users.xml，直接就可以读取到Tomcat的管理员账号权限，从而直接通过外部访问的形式进入Tomcat的管理界面进行控制。
登录进来之后直接到WAR file to deploy功能点，进行war包的部署（在这里使用压缩的方式将网站后门压缩成zip格式然后修改后缀名.zip为.war即可），点击Browser选择war包然后点击Deploy：
这里部署上去之后回到Applications功能点，可以看到部署的情况，点击你的命名链接然后加上你压缩的文件名（这里我的是 /vulkey/vulkey.jsp）使用Webshell管理工具进行管理，看见了我久违的界面，久违的root权限：
总结因为后渗透可能会影响正常业务的运行，所以没有继续进行下去，很遗憾，希望下次有机会。 END: 送给大家一句话：心细则挖天下。